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1769 
CONCERNING THE JAPANESE PUBLIC’S 
EVALUATION OF SUPREME  
COURT JUSTICES 
TOKUJI IZUMI

 
I 
The Japanese Election Law fixes the size of the House of 
Representatives (Lower House) at 480 members, with the further 
requirement that 300 of its members shall be elected through single-
member constituencies, and the remaining 180 seats shall be filled through 
multidistrict elections
1
 on the basis of proportional representation. For the 
single-constituency elections, the population effectively represented by a 
congressman (i.e., the population-per-constituency ratio) varies widely 
between districts and heavily favors rural areas and small towns over 
major cities. For instance, in large cities like Tokyo and Osaka, a 
congressman represents a group of electorates that is twice that of small 
towns. This amounts to dilution of voting power, effectively rendering the 
vote of a large-city resident worth only half a vote. 
Similarly, the election law fixes the size of the House of Councilors 
(Upper House) at 242 members: 146 of its members are to be elected 
through prefectural-district elections, while the remaining 96 seats are to 
be filled through nationwide elections on the basis of proportional 
representation. For the prefectural-district elections, the population 
effectively represented by a councilor (i.e., the population-per-
constituency ratio) varies widely between districts and favors less densely 
populated areas. For instance, in large cities like Tokyo and Osaka, a 
councilor represents constituencies that are five times the population size 
of those found in small towns. This, likewise, amounts to dilution of 
voting power, effectively making the vote of a large-city resident worth 
only one-fifth of a vote.  
Such disparities in voting power clearly violate the equality guarantee 
of the Japanese Constitution.
2
 
 
 
  Former Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan. Translated by Kyotaro Hemmi. 
 1. Translator’s note: Eleven districts are combined to form a single constituency for purposes of 
the multidistrict elections. 
 2. The relevant provisions of the Japanese Constitution read as follows: ―All of the people are 
equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations 
because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.‖ NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] 
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However, like the legislatures of many other nations, the Japanese Diet 
fails to reform the election laws on an ongoing basis in order to ensure that 
voting power remains evenly distributed across citizens regardless of 
where they live. In fact, for such reform to take place, the voters’ sole 
recourse is to bring suit in the Supreme Court challenging the electoral 
malapportionment as unconstitutional.  
Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution provides that ―[t]he Supreme 
Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the 
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.‖3 Every time 
elections for the Lower House and the Upper House have taken place, 
residents of large cities have brought suit challenging the dilution of their 
voting power. 
With respect to the apportionment of seats in the Diet, the Supreme 
Court has thus far deferred to the Diet’s discretion in electoral matters. 
Specifically, the Supreme Court has ruled as follows: 
Our Constitution entrusts, in principle, the actual determination of 
the design of the system of election of members of both houses to 
the discretion of Parliament. Since Parliament is empowered to 
determine an appropriate structure for the electoral system in order 
to achieve the goal of electing fair and effective representatives to 
both the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors, an 
electoral system adopted by Parliament is unconstitutional only if its 
specific features violate the requirement of equal treatment under 
the law even after Parliament’s power of discretion has been 
properly taken into account.
4
 
The Supreme Court has further determined that, as long as vote dilution 
remains within certain limits, the Diet is properly exercising its 
discretionary powers as they relate to voting equality.
5
 In fact, the Court’s 
 
 
[CONSTITUTION], art. 14, para. 1. ―The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials 
and to dismiss them.‖ NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 15, para. 1. ―Universal adult 
suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials.‖ NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] 
[CONSTITUTION], art. 15, para. 3. ―Both Houses shall consist of elected members, representative of all 
the people.‖ NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 43, para. 1. ―The qualifications of 
members of both Houses and their electors shall be fixed by law. However, there shall be no 
discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status, family origin, education, property or income.‖ 
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 44, para. 1. 
 3. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81, para. 1. 
 4. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 10, 1999, 53 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1577 (grand bench). 
 5. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 21, 1988, 42 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 644 (2d petty bench) (upholding a 1-to-2.92 vote dilution ratio, the largest margin upheld by 
the Supreme Court with respect to Lower House elections); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 21, 1988, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/17
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precedents indicate that vote dilution is constitutional, provided that 
disparities in the value of a vote do not exceed a ratio of 3:1 in elections 
for the Lower House
6
 or 6:1 in elections for the Upper House.
7
 
In my opinion, voting equality forms the foundation of democratic 
societies; therefore, I feel that questions of electoral apportionment that 
determine the value of people’s votes should not be left to the broad 
discretion of the Diet. Moreover, in circumstances where 
malapportionment becomes apparent, I feel that it is the responsibility of 
the judiciary to correct such problems. Thus, in all three of the cases 
involving electoral malapportionment that I encountered during my tenure 
as a Supreme Court Justice,
8
 I wrote a dissent that concluded there had 
been a constitutional violation. 
II 
Currently, I work at the TMI General Law Office. Within the same 
office, I have a sixty-eight-year-old colleague by the name of Hidetoshi 
Masunaga.
9
 Mr. Masunaga studied abroad and performed research at 
Columbia Law School, and he has also studied the malapportionment 
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. Aiming to realize a 
society where voters each enjoy a full vote (instead of just one-half or one-
fifth of a vote), Masunaga has decided to dedicate his remaining life to 
bringing about a true form of democracy to Japan. Thinking in ways 
similar to my own, Masunaga also does not expect the Diet to voluntarily 
revise the election law and feels that, unless the Supreme Court finds that 
the current apportionment scheme is unconstitutional, the elections will 
continue to be administered in much the same manner. However, as 
 
 
155 SHŪMIN 65 (2d petty bench) (upholding a 1-to-5.85 vote dilution ratio, the largest margin upheld 
by the Supreme Court with respect to Upper House elections). 
 6. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 20, 1993, 47 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 67 (grand bench) (holding that the 1-to-3.18 dilution ratio exceeds the permissible degree of 
the Diet’s discretionary powers). 
 7. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 11, 1996, 50 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 2283 (grand bench) (holding that the 1-to-6.59 dilution ratio exceeds the permissible degree 
of the Diet’s discretionary powers). 
 8. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 13, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1617 (grand bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 4, 2006, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 2696 (grand bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 14, 2004, 58 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 56 (grand bench). 
 9. Editor’s note: In the original Japanese version of this article, Justice Izumi consistently refers 
to Mr. Masunaga as ―Masunaga Bengoshi‖ and never as ―Hideotoshi Masunaga.‖ ―Bengoshi‖ is the 
title given to lawyers in Japan, not a name. To prevent confusion, ―Hidetoshi Masunaga‖ has been 
substituted for ―Masunaga Bengoshi.‖  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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previously described, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to limit the 
Diet’s broad discretion over matters of electoral apportionment system. In 
response, Mr. Masunaga has sought to attract public attention to a practice 
known as the People’s Evaluation of the Supreme Court Justices10 
(―Evaluation‖).  
Article 79 of the Japanese Constitution states as follows: 
The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be 
reviewed by the people at the first general election of members of 
the House of Representatives following their appointment, and shall 
be reviewed again at the first general election of members of the 
House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10) years, and in the 
same manner thereafter. 
 In cases mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, when the 
majority of the voters favors the dismissal of a judge, he shall be 
dismissed.
11
  
Not only is Evaluation one of the basic suffrage rights guaranteed to the 
people, but it also offers the people an indirect way to correct the vote 
dilution that they experience when voting for members of the Diet.
12
 In 
these Evaluations, unlike elections for the Diet, the people enjoy truly 
equal voting power. Thus, in theory, if the people are informed about 
which Justices have approved vote dilution when they evaluate the 
Justices, the people can use the Evaluations to bring about changes in the 
Supreme Court, which may lead the Court to cure the electoral 
malapportionment problems in the context of elections for the Diet. 
On the theory that the Evaluations could be utilized to inform voters of 
which Justices had opposed the ―one person, one vote‖ principle that is the 
cornerstone of democracy, Masunaga gathered forty-two individuals and 
launched an organization called the ―People’s Assembly to Achieve One 
Person, One Vote‖ (the ―Equal Vote Assembly,‖ or ―Assembly‖). After 
receiving an invitation to join the movement, I became one of these forty-
two members of the organization and associated my name publicly with 
the Assembly. While it may said that the inclusion of my name functioned 
as a type of public endorsement for the Assembly, it must however be 
noted that the extent of my participation was limited to simply signing my 
 
 
 10. Saikō Saibansho Saibankan Kokuminshinsahō [Law of the People’s Evaluation of the 
Supreme Court Justices], Law No. 136 of 1947. 
 11. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 79, paras. 2–3.  
 12. Translator’s note: Evaluations are conducted at the national level. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/17
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name among the proponents of the movement. Furthermore, although the 
movement was said to be a type of ―Assembly,‖ in reality the ―movement‖ 
simply consisted of a small number of people revolving around Masunaga. 
In conjunction with the Lower House elections held on August 30, 
2009, an Evaluation of nine Justices was held. These nine Justices had all 
joined the Supreme Court subsequent to the previous Evaluation, which 
had been held on September 11, 2005; further, six of the nine evaluated 
Justices had not participated in any malapportionment cases. Among the 
nine Justices who faced evaluation by the voters, two—Justice Wakui and 
Justice Nasu—had rendered opinions in a 2007 case approving the 
constitutionality of voting-power disparities in excess of a two-to-one 
ratio.
13
 In the period leading up to the Evaluation, the Equal Vote 
Assembly published fifteen full-page advertisements in national 
newspapers, informing the public of the stances taken by Justices Wakui 
and Nasu in this malapportionment case. 
As for the process itself, the Evaluation is conducted using paper 
ballots, with the order in which the names are listed determined at random 
by a lottery managed by the Election Administration Commission. To 
indicate disapproval of a Justice, a voter marks an ―X‖ in the column 
adjacent to and above the corresponding name; otherwise, no marks are to 
be made above the names of the Justices. These ballots are then deposited 
by the voters into a box, and the disapproval marks are subsequently 
tallied. 
The result of the 2009 Evaluation showed that the nine Justices 
gathered an average disapproval rating of 6.69%.
14
 The highest 
disapproval rate, at 7.73%, was given to Justice Wakui, and the second-
highest disapproval, at 7.45%, went to Justice Nasu.
15
 
Historically, the disapproval rank has correlated directly with the order 
in which the names appear on the ballot. That is, the Justice whose name 
appears first on the ballot has traditionally received the highest 
disapproval rate, while the Justice with his or her name placed at the 
bottom of the ballot has generally enjoyed the lowest disapproval rate. 
However, for the August 2009 Evaluation, Justice Wakui collected the 
highest disapproval rate, even though his name appeared third on the 
 
 
 13. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 13, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1617. 
 14. Election Related Documents, MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMM., http://www. 
soumu.go.jp/senkyo/senkyo_s/data/shugiin45/index.html (last visited May 3, 2011). 
 15. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ballot, and the second-highest disapproval rate belonged to Justice Nasu, 
despite the fact that his name appeared sixth on the ballot. 
Strictly speaking, it may seem as if some proportion of the voters were 
affected by the Equal Vote Assembly’s efforts. However, it must be 
pointed out that the percentage of voters who were influenced by the 
Assembly’s extensive publicity campaign appears to have been no more 
than 1.2%, which translates to a mere 780,000 voters.
16
  
This type of low public impact was something that I had predicted: 
knowing that the people do not take much interest in the Evaluation, I 
predicted that the Assembly’s advertisements would have minimal effect 
on the general public. 
By contrast, however, the Equal Vote Assembly’s efforts may have had 
a greater impact on the judiciary. In fact, I feel that the Equal Vote 
Assembly’s advertisements made it significantly apparent to the courts 
that it was the duty of judges—as those entrusted to uphold the law—to 
correct the problem of vote dilution. 
Revolving around Mr. Masunaga, groups consisting of concerned 
citizens brought malapportionment challenges in nine high courts to the 
constitutionality of the Lower House elections held on August 30, 2009. 
Two of the high courts,
17
 following Supreme Court precedent, rejected the 
constitutional challenges. In an unprecedented move, however, the 
remaining seven high courts
18
 departed from Supreme Court precedent and 
found violations of the constitutional right to equality. It is my belief that 
the Equal Vote Assembly and its publicity campaign may have influenced 
the judges on these seven high courts.  
 
 
 16. Id. It is critical to distinguish between an eligible voter and a valid voter. Currently, there are 
103,841,491 eligible voters. However, the number of eligible voters does not necessarily reflect the 
number of actual valid votes; in fact, an estimated thirty-four percent of the eligible populace either (1) 
affirmatively chooses to abstain from voting, or (2) fails to properly follow the voting procedures. For 
the aforementioned Evaluation, there were—in total—66,939,295 valid votes. Among these votes, 
some expressed disapproval of particular Justices. Specifically, between Justice Nasu and Justice 
Wakui, there was an average of 5,082,326 disapproval votes; between the other Justices, the average 
number of disapproval votes was 4,304,348. The difference between the two averages—which 
represent the approximate number of voters influenced by the Equal Vote Assembly—was 777,978 
votes. This final figure is roughly equal to 1.2% of all the valid votes. 
 17. Tokyo Kōtōsaibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Mar. 11, 2010, 2077 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 29; 
Sapporo Kōtōsaibansho [Sapporo High Ct.] Apr. 27, 2010 (unpublished opinion). 
 18. See, e.g., Takamatsu Kōtōsaibansho [Takamatsu High Ct.] Apr. 8, 2010 (unpublished 
opinion); Nagoya Kōtōsaibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] Mar. 18, 2010 (unpublished opinion); Fukuoka 
Kōtōsaibansho [Fukuoka High Ct.] Mar. 12, 2010 (unpublished opinion); Fukuoka Kōtōsaibansho 
[Fukuoka High Ct.] Mar. 9, 2010, 1320 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 46 (Naha Branch); Tokyo 
Kōtōsaibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Feb. 24, 2010 (unpublished opinion); Hiroshima Kōtōsaibansho 
[Hiroshima High Ct.] Jan. 25, 2010, 2075 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 15; Osaka Kōtōsaibansho [Osaka High 
Ct.] Dec. 28, 2009, 2075 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 3.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/17
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These nine lawsuits are currently being litigated before the Supreme 
Court.
19
 I am anxiously waiting to see how the Supreme Court will rule in 
these cases. 
III 
As the body responsible for overseeing the judiciary, the Supreme 
Court is given the heavy responsibility, and the accompanying great 
authority, of exercising judicial review—should such action be deemed 
necessary. In light of this constitutional framework, and because the 
principle of democracy mandates that ultimate power be exercised by the 
people, I feel that the people should have an effective opportunity to 
express their opinions and to participate in the selection of the Justices. 
The Evaluations were originally designed with this democratic principle in 
mind, and if they are to truly operate as originally envisioned by the 
Constitution, they should enable the people to pass judgment upon the 
appropriateness of each Justice’s appointment. 
IV 
However, I feel that the Evaluation system—in practice—fails to 
properly operate as a mechanism of democracy in the ways discussed 
above. Moreover, the Evaluations, as they are currently rendered, only 
 
 
 19. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] March 23, 2011 (pending publication in SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]). For press coverage of the decision, see Ippyō no kakusa yōnin shisei-tenkan 
[Regarding the Voting-Power Disparity: Acknowledgement of a Changing Judicial Posture], NIHON 
KEIZAI SHINBUN [NIKKEI], Mar. 24, 2011, at Morning Edition 29. Translator’s note: On March 23, 
2011, the Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the seven High Courts. In deciding the case, the 
Court articulated a constitutional standard for evaluating malapportionment cases: If (1) there is a 
violation of the equality principle found in the Constitution, and (2) such violation is not corrected 
within a reasonable time, then the apportionment scheme is unconstitutional. Based on the 
circumstances of the case, the Court held that the equality principle had been violated, but nevertheless 
refrained from ruling that the apportionment scheme was unconstitutional, because ―a reasonable time‖ 
had not yet elapsed. In other words, the decision concludes that the apportionment scheme is 
unconstitutional in its present form. Thus, while the decision fell short of an actual ruling of 
unconstitutionality, the groundbreaking or ―unprecedented‖ nature of the decision, as Justice Izumi 
puts it, is apparent from the reasoning of the case. Specifically, because (1) the case involved a 2.3-to-
1 disparity in the value of votes, and (2) the Court determined that the equality principle had been 
violated, the decision implicitly concluded that constitutional violations may be found even in 
situations where the disparity in the value of votes falls short of the 3-to-1 limit established by the 
Court’s earlier decisions. As such, the Court—in effect—partially followed Justice Izumi’s dissent in 
the October 4, 2006, Grand Bench decision. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 13, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1617 (Izumi, J., dissenting). It is worth mentioning that 
Justice Izumi, in contrast to the March 23, 2011, decision, expressly wrote in his dissent that a 
violation of the equality principle—by itself, and without regard to whether a ―reasonable time‖ had 
elapsed—ought to be sufficient to establish the existence of a constitutional violation. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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function to highlight the Justices’ high status. Therefore, since (1) 
conducting the Evaluations involves considerable expense, and (2) their 
results have minimal practical impact on the Justices, it may even be 
appropriate to consider discontinuing the Evaluation system altogether. 
Nevertheless, as (1) the Japanese Constitution expressly mandates the 
administration of the Evaluations, and (2) the process for amending the 
Constitution is extremely difficult, we may have no choice but to continue 
administering the Evaluations. 
Approximately 93% of voters participate in the Evaluation without 
putting much thought into their ballots.
20
 This, however, is not a sign of 
popular trust or confidence in the Supreme Court, but rather results from 
the public’s general lack of interest in the Court and its members. 
Moreover, I presume that the remaining 7% cast disapproval votes during 
the Evaluation not because they disapproved of any particular Justices, but 
rather to express their general dissatisfaction with the national 
government. 
There are two reasons why the Evaluations fail to function properly. 
First, the Supreme Court has few opportunities to decide highly 
contentious cases that might attract public attention. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court tends to voluntarily refrain from handing down decisions 
that might be provocative or have a considerable impact on the general 
public. As a consequence, the people do not show much interest in the 
Supreme Court. 
Second, there are very few opportunities for the people to get to know 
the Justices. Although Justices are appointed by the Cabinet,
21
 the people 
are not informed about the specific details concerning potential 
appointees; nor are they provided the reasons for why a particular Justice 
was appointed to the Bench. Furthermore, because Justices face evaluation 
in conjunction with the first general election
22
 that occurs after their initial 
appointment, it is frequently the case that they have yet to participate in 
any important decisions at the time they are evaluated. As a result, voters 
do not have an adequate basis upon which to evaluate them. Additionally, 
because Justices are appointed when they are roughly sixty-five years of 
age and subsequently leave the Bench within the next five or six years 
 
 
 20. Election Related Documents, MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMMC’NS, http://www. 
soumu.go.jp/senkyo/senkyo_s/data/shugiin45/index.html (last visited May 3, 2011). 
 21. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 6, para. 2; NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] 
[CONSTITUTION], art. 79, para. 1. 
 22. The general election, mentioned above, is in reference to the election of the Lower House 
Diet-members. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/17
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(due to the mandatory retirement age that is set by statute),
23
 Justices 
rarely encounter more than one Evaluation and have often retired before 
the public has a chance to become acquainted with them. 
V 
Although I feel that the above-outlined situation will likely remain 
unchanged, I have considered several ways in which the Evaluations could 
be improved. I would now like to comment on these points. 
First, there are fifteen positions on the Supreme Court. The Judicial 
Office Law states that a Justice should (1) have high levels of discernment, 
(2) have attained and learned the fundamental concepts of law, and (3) be 
at least forty years of age;
24
 the Law further requires that at least ten of the 
Justices each possess over twenty years of experience as practitioners of 
law.
25
 While these rules govern the formal composition of the Court, in 
reality, it is customary to have the fifteen Justices appointed in the 
following manner: six career judges; four former attorneys; two former 
prosecutors; two from government administrative positions; and one legal 
scholar. 
With respect to the two former administrative officials and the one 
legal scholar, the Cabinet—exercising its independent discretion—
appoints such Justices. As for the remaining twelve positions, the Cabinet 
makes the appointments after consulting the Chief Justice. Specifically, 
the Chief Justice—in his sole discretion—nominates six candidates from 
the career judiciary, recommends four candidates from the bar on the 
advice of the Japanese Bar Association, and nominates two prosecutors in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Ministry of Justice.  
These appointment processes take place behind closed doors, and the 
names of potential Justices are kept secret until an official announcement 
is made by the Cabinet. Following the Cabinet’s disclosure, the result of 
the appointments is only made known to the public through small articles 
circulated in newspapers.  
 
 
 23. Article 50 of the Judicial Office Law reads as follows:  
Justices of the Supreme Court shall retire upon the attainment of seventy years of age. Judges 
of High Courts, District Courts, or Family Courts shall retire upon the attainment of sixty five 
years of age. Judges of Summary Courts shall retire upon the attainment of seventy years of 
age. 
Saibanshohō [Judicial Office Law], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 50. 
 24. Id. art. 41. 
 25. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1778 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1769 
 
 
 
 
Concerning the process of appointing the Justices, I feel that it would 
be better to first organize a selection committee—consisting of judges, 
prosecutors, attorneys, and scholars—and subsequently have the 
committee advise the Cabinet on the appointments. By proceeding in this 
manner, I believe that the people’s interest in the Supreme Court will 
gradually increase, which in turn will familiarize the people with the 
Justices themselves. 
Second, with respect to constitutional litigation, the Supreme Court 
does not frequently take an aggressive or assertive approach in reaching its 
decisions. This tendency is likely due to the shortage of Justices who have 
experience handling constitutional issues.  
It can hardly be said that the deliberations among the Justices over 
constitutional issues are lively or full of vigorous debate. I believe that, 
among the fifteen Justices, there should be at least three scholars who 
specialized in either constitutional law or public law. By including one 
constitutional law or public law specialist on each of the three petty 
benches,
26
 the deliberations among the Justices will likely become more 
lively and invigorated. It is my belief that the result will be a more 
assertive approach to constitutional issues that will in turn attract the 
interest of the general public. 
Third, I feel that it is wise to appoint Justices who are under the age of 
sixty. In order to become well versed at composing separate opinions, it is 
necessary for the Justices to possess years of experience on the bench. 
With this in mind, it may be said that Justices, who are appointed when 
they are roughly sixty-five years of age, reach the mandatory retirement 
age of seventy before attaining the modes of thinking that are specifically 
attuned to resolving constitutional issues. 
Fourth, there are currently thirty-seven law clerks shared by the entire 
Supreme Court. A law clerk, or chousakan, is responsible for conducting 
necessary research and compiling the resulting materials into reports. It 
must be noted that a chousakan does not prepare materials for any 
particular Justice; nor is he or she assigned to any specific Justice.  
In each Justice’s chambers, two specially assigned secretaries provide 
support, but as these secretaries do not possess legal training, the 
chousakans are the principal source of assistance for the Justices. 
 
 
 26. Editor’s note: The fifteen-member Supreme Court is divided into three petty benches 
consisting of five Justices each. The vast majority of the Court’s cases are decided by the petty 
benches as opposed to the grand bench consisting of all fifteen justices. See David S. Law, The 
Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545, 1569 (2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/17
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Specifically, as the Supreme Court handles roughly 7000 cases per term,
27
 
support from the chousakans becomes critical to efficient and proper 
processing of the docket. While their specific duties lie in preparing 
reports on relevant precedent, chousakans also play an important role in 
helping the Justices by preventing them from making critical judicial 
errors.
28
  
It is the responsibility of the Justices to overrule prior decisions or, on 
other occasions, to devise innovative rationales that can reconcile the 
particularities of certain cases with precedent. To perform these tasks, they 
must have the opportunity to explore and test their own views. It is 
therefore necessary for each Justice to have individually assigned law 
clerks who can function as debate partners.  
Currently, the Justices do not have their own law clerks, which may 
help to explain the dearth of separate opinions. If the Justices are enabled 
to express a broader range of opinions, it is conceivable that this would 
invigorate the Court’s deliberations, which in turn could lead to an 
increase in the Court’s production of important jurisprudence. One likely 
consequence is that the general public would develop a greater interest in 
the workings of the Supreme Court. 
Finally, it is my understanding that the responsibility of the judiciary is 
to assertively uphold the three elements of the constitional order 
emphasized by Justice Stone in footnote four of Carolene Products
29
: the 
specific limitations found in the Constitution, the integrity of political 
processes, and the rights of minority groups. In particular, the Justices 
must each (1) articulate a clear and distinctive jurisprudential vision of the 
restraints and duties imposed by law, and (2) convey this vision to the 
general public in their decisions. In this way, the people will have the 
opportunity to learn what they need in order to evaluate the Justices 
properly and to have a meaningful basis for disapproving of particular 
Justices. 
 
 
 27. Information: Statistical Tables, SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/ 
info/index.html (last visited May 3, 2011). 
 28. Editor’s note: Whereas law clerks in the United States are usually recent law school 
graduates with little or no legal or judicial experience, a chousakan is a judge who already possesses 
years of judicial experience and is handpicked to assist the Supreme Court for several years. See 
Masako Kamiya, “Chōsakan”: Research Judges Toiling at the Stone Fortress, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1601 (2011); Law, supra note 26, at 1579. 
 29. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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VI 
 
The goal of the Equal Vote Assembly is to bring to light the Justices’ 
jurisprudential positions in order to make the Evaluations meaningful and 
effective. Putting aside the issue of the degree to which the movement 
actually influenced the people, I believe that the efforts made by the Equal 
Vote Assembly nevertheless succeeded at encouraging judges to become 
more aware of their responsibilities within the Japanese constitutional 
system.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/17
